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ABSTRACT
Dubai is in crisis. The overall vacancy rate of the city continues to grow as more buildings come online with few or no tenants; moreover, 
the population has declined by one quarter of a million in 2009 alone. Dubai’s economic engine, which quickly transformed huge 
amounts of capital into new architectural “bling,” has stalled, revealing the underlying instability of a city built on speculation rather 
than foresight. Large swathes of the city remain incomplete and largely uninhabited, creating vast urban blights. Dubai risks damage 
to both its image and its ability to function. The city’s decline, however, presents a unique opportunity for immediate and sweeping 
intervention against urban decay. My thesis proposes a dialectical planning process of retrofitting and shrink-wrapping Dubai.
The retrofit strategy engages stopped building projects crucial to Dubai’s function and image. The technical goal is to generate 
corridors of urbanity that permit the city to operate while the population and economy recover. The theoretical aim is not to produce 
new models for planning, but to generate design proposals that overtly critique and improve upon the existing built environment. 
The shrink-wrap strategy repositions Dubai’s vast oversupply of real estate as an investment for the future. This directive removes 
redundant buildings or even whole developments from the market and preserves them for eventual redeployment. The goal is to create 
an image of progressiveness and anticipation, while also physically maintaining these built assets to prevent further economic loses. 
These planning strategies are posited as theoretical and marketable rationales for investment in Dubai’s urban future.
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PACKAGE 1 //ASSESSMENT OF CONTEMPORARY GROWTH OF METROPOLITAN DUBAI 
 Dubai, just a few years ago, was heralded as a laboratory for new architectures and urbanisms. Architects and 
planners, followed by speculative real estate investors, flocked to Dubai to build and make a name for themselves. The 
excesses of the resultant unreflective development have left Dubai rife with many typical urban problems, including 
traffic congestion, over-taxed water and electrical grids, and low quality of life for a majority of its inhabitants. Rather 
than produce innovative new ways to design and experience the city, Dubai’s builders have simply augmented these 
problems, continuing the pattern at a scale and pace beyond comprehension. 
 Recently, the economic engine that fueled Dubai’s real estate boom has stalled, encouraging the Dubai government 
to puruse swift measures to maintain the solvency of its largest real estate developers. This temporary pause in Dubai’s 
unpredented urban expansion provides a critical moment to reflect and improve upon what has already been produced. 
The following is a broad assessment of Dubai’s recent growth, with emphasis on city footprint and population. This 
analysis uses an economic lens to argue that the overall symptoms of the current crisis are embedded in the way the 
Emirate developed laissez-faire over the past two decades. These long-term missteps in Dubai’s urban planning were 
simply revealed by the current global economic crisis. 
 Dubai is a characteristically private city, consisting of a patchwork of exclusive gated communities and 
developments.1 The city’s major growth spurt began in the late 1990’s. Development focused along the central 
thoroughfare, Sheikh Zayed Road, which runs parallel to the coastline, linking the city of Dubai with its main container 
port Jebel Ali and neighboring Emirates. This linear growth pattern caused extreme congestion along this corridor, 
and encouraged more recent radial development into the desert along Emirates Road and offshore with projects such 
as Palm Jumeirah. Since 1990, Dubai’s developed footprint has grown 400% (1287 km^2) and is projected to reach 
800% (2895 km^2) of this level in 2016. This rapid territorial expansion has greatly taxed the city’s ability to provide 
adequate infrastructure and delivery of services. The population has also grown exponentially, with the number of 
inhabitants doubling roughly each decade since 1970. The population peaked in 2008 at 1.5 million inhabitants. The 
current downturn, however, led to a population decline of 17% in 2009 alone, a loss of roughly 250,000 inhabitants. 
Dubai’s rapid rise over the past decade and immediate decline, due to economic factors, is without precedent. For 
example, the city of Detroit had a similar meteoric rise in the 1930’s, but its decline has unfolded slowly over multiple 
decades. Dubai’s population decline is more comparable with cities depleted by natural disaster such as New Orleans or 
political conflict such as Mogadishu. In Dubai’s case, however, the causes are its long-term growth and urban planning 
strategies.
 Lacking substantial oil reserves, Dubai’s ruling family has pursued a vastly different growth strategy from 
its Gulf neighbors, investing in infrastructure to augment its geographical advantages for international trade and 
1  Moustaffa, Amer. ; Rifiki, Fatih A., “Al Manakh,” Volume 12 (Rotterdam: Archis, 2007), 29.
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commerce. This “build it and they will come” approach of aggressive local investment in tax-free trade facilities and 
signature luxury developments has encouraged reciprocal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Half of the Dubai’s land area 
is currently devoted to FDI in a combination of free-ports, special free-trade zones and freehold property developments. 
Projects planned between 2010-2016 would devote roughly 75% of the city’s footprint to this end. This influx of foreign 
capital suggests not only local but international culpability for Dubai’s current decline.2 Freehold properties have had 
the greatest impact on Dubai’s footprint, as foreign property-ownership rights have sparked a boom in housing and 
supporting infrastructure. Many of these properties serve as investments or vacation homes, leading to large areas of 
the newly developed city remaining vacant for much of the year. Real estate in this context quickly loses its use-value 
as dwelling or office space to become a luxury commodity, freely traded on the world market.
 Dubai has sought to create property demand by offering an abundant supply of luxury properties for speculative 
investment. This growth strategy, enabled by cheap imported construction labor, has fueled Dubai’s meteoric rise 
and its current downturn. To assess the scale and long-term implications of Emirate’s growth strategy, compare the 
floor-area of Manhattan (87 km^2) with the floor-area completed and proposed to be constructed in the Dubai. Since 
2006, the city has added the floor-area equivalent to 1.44 Manhattans (125 km^2), with 1 Manhattan currently under 
construction, and an astonishing floor-area equivalent to 10 Manhattans (870km^2) currently cancelled or on hold. 
That these projects outpaced any reasonable projections of population growth is shown in the number of planned units 
versus population growth trends. Given the number of planned units for construction between 2010-2016, Dubai’s 
population should rise from 1.5 to 4.5 million (300%) in that time. In the best-case real-world scenario, however, 
Dubai’s previous growth rate would be restored in 2010 and reach 2.1 million in 2016. The number of proposed units, 
however, would accommodate a population double that figure. This represents roughly a 2:1 oversupply of units in the 
city by 2016, turning vast swaths of an already sparsely populated new city into ghost-towns. In a city where image is 
everything, stagnation and urban decay will tarnish Dubai’s reputation as the most stable market in the Middle East; 
moreover, quality of life in the city will further erode, as financial resources to maintain its infrastructure and services 
evaporate with its reputation. 
2  Malcom, Claire. ed. “Cityscape Dubai 2009 Report.” (Dubai: Nicholas Publishing International, 2009), 22-25
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PHYSICAL GROWTH OF DUBAI
FROM 1990-2016 : PROJECTED 900% LAND AREA INCREASE, 1990-2016400% LAND AREA INCREASE, 1990-2010DEVELOPED CITY OCCUPIES 1287 KM^2 IN 2010
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POPULATION TRENDS 
IN DUBAI, 1900-PRESENT : 150% INCREASE IN POPULATION, 2000-200917% DECREASE, 2009-PRESENT-250,000 INHABITANTS, 2009-PRESENT
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DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(FDI), 2003-2009 : EU ACCOUNTS  FOR 38% OF DUBAI FDIUSA ACCOUNTS FOR 26% OF DUBAI FDIFDI FUNDED 1,326 PROJECTS IN DUBAI
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LAND AREA DEVOTED TO
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT :
50% OF CURRENT DEVELOPED AREA
 OR 643 KM^2
100% OF PROPOSED GROWTH AREA
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FLOOR AREA 
EQUIVALENT OF : 10 MANHATTANS CANCELLED OR ON HOLD1 MANHATTAN CURRENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION1.44 MANHATTANS COMPLETED SINCE 2006
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PROJECTED POPULATION BASED 
ON PLANNED HOUSING UNITS : 300% POPULATION INCREASE BY 20161.5 MILLION PEOPLE IN 20094.5 MILLION PEOPLE IN 2016
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ACTUAL VERSUS PLANNED
POPULATION PROJECTIONS : 2016 SUPPLY OUTSTRIPS POPULATION DEMAND 2:12010 SUPPLY OUTSTRIPS POPULATION DEMAND 1.4:150%-60% OF PLANNED UNITS UNINHABITED IN 2016
26
27
28
PACKAGE 2 //ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AT RISK
 Since 2006, 850+ mid to high-rise building projects, worth an estimated USD 220 billion, have been either 
commenced or completed in Dubai. By comparison, Manhattan boasts 1500 of these buildings in total. Dubai’s three 
state-owned master-plan developers, EMAAR, Nakheel and Dubai Properties, orchestrated this monumental undertaking 
by selling property off-plan (pre-construction) to investors around the world. Dubai’s image of financial stability and 
economic openness served as incentive for these investments. Real estate in Dubai subsequently became a hot commodity, 
and investors quickly flipped these properties for profit, fueling a speculative frenzy. A majority of these residential and 
commercial units thus serve as investment properties, leaving the newest parts of Dubai with high occupancy rates but 
low inhabitation and use rates. The current global financial crisis quickly shuttered Dubai’s speculative (off-plan) real 
estate markets. As a result, the overall vacancy rate of the city grows steadily, as more buildings come online with few 
or no tenants. Massive development projects such as Dubailand as well as hundreds of individual building projects have 
been either delayed or canceled, leaving large sections of the city incomplete and uninhabited. 
 To assess the scale and value of at-risk development projects, I have compiled a database of all building projects 
commenced in Dubai since 2006. The database combines development information from authorities in global real 
estate, including Emporis and Zawya, with field research in Dubai conducted Summer 2009. The database indexes vital 
information about each building’s developer, size, value, use-type, projected inhabitants, location, and construction 
status. These data are then juxtaposed with a territorial analysis of Dubai in terms of development status, prominence, 
population density, and function to ascertain how each building fits within the context of the city. 
 Of the 866 buildings catalogued in the database, 313 have been delayed or stopped indefinitely. A majority 
of these projects are located in remote and incomplete areas of the city such as the Jumeirah Village and Dubailand 
developments along Emirates Road. These areas have minimal road and services infrastructure, and their development is 
sparse. 552 buildings are either completed or currently under construction, a majority of which are found in prominent 
areas of the city such as along Sheikh Zayed Road. These prominent areas of the city are most visible to tourists, 
investors and potential residents visiting the city. The eventual completion and occupancy of these buildings will be vital 
to Dubai’s image and function.
 Dubai’s population distribution outside of the central city is disjointed with vast low-density developments 
surrounding a handful of high-density enclaves. The latter are of two types: workers’ camps on Dubai’s periphery and 
Manhattan-like real estate developments such as Business Bay and Dubai Marina located along Sheikh Zayed Road. 
509 projects in the database are found in these high-density pockets of the city, further exacerbating conditions of 
extreme population density, surrounded by areas of comparitive emptiness. The remaining 357 projects are designed 
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for medium and low-density occupation and are predominantly south of Sheikh Zayed Road, in developments such as 
Dubai Sports City and Silicon Oasis. The pursuit of a more evenly distributed population density across Dubai’s disparate 
developments will be essential to relieve conditions of traffic congestion, over-taxed water and electricity resources, and 
over-crowding.
 700+ buildings, worth and estimated USD 197 billion, are targeted for the high-end market as luxury residential 
units, theme parks, retail and Grade “A” commercial office space. This market has little demand given the current 
economic downturn, which puts a majority of these projects at risk of remaining largely incomplete and uninhabited for 
years to come. These properties are distributed throughout the city; therefore, a broad initiative must be undertaken to 
diversify the property market. There is pent-up demand in Dubai and neighboring Emirates for middle and lower-class 
housing as well as affordable office and rental properties. Multiple entry points for investment and ownership should 
be made available to help the city recover from the long-term effects of a collapsed speculative real estate market. 
Properties located in areas zoned for multiple uses (commercial, retail and residential) provide the greatest flexibility 
to accommodate such adjustments; moreover, these areas also are centrally located along Sheikh Zayed Road, the 
coastline, and the Dubai Creek. It is these multi-use developments through which Dubai could immediately invest in its 
urban future.
 Given the staggering number and value of buildings at risk, coupled with a 17% population loss in 2009, Dubai 
risks damage to both its image and its ability to function. The rapidity of the city’s decline, however, presents a unique 
opportunity for immediate and sweeping intervention against long-term urban decay. As a direction out of this morass, 
I propose a dialectical process of revision and preservation: to retrofit and shrink-wrap Dubai.
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PACKAGE 3 //RETROFIT + SHRINK-WRAP URBAN PLANNING DIRECTIVES
 Dubai’s recent economic crisis has uncovered long-term pitfalls in its overall urban development strategy. Much 
of the city has been built on speculative real estate, creating vast oversupplies of high-end residential, office and 
retail units. This oversupply is further augmented by Dubai’s development structure. The city consists of a patchwork 
of enclaves, each with an independent master plan. Each development essentially operates as a city within a city, 
neither accounting for property offerings in nearby developments nor operating together as a coherent urban fabric. 
Redundancies created by Dubai’s long-term development process, coupled with a drastic population loss in 2009, puts 
large sections of the city at risk of remaining largely uninhabited and incomplete.
 As an alternative urban planning strategy, I propose a dialectical process of retrofitting (revising) and shrink-
wrapping (preserving) existing real estate assets. This process begins with an assessment of which areas to revise, with 
expanded pedestrian infrastructure and investment incentives, and which areas to decommission and preserve for future 
redeployment. Both strategies engage the buildings as well as the surrounding ground to create comprehensive planning 
directives that extend well beyond each building footprint. Major contextual considerations include construction status, 
population density, function, and prominence. The goal of the retrofit and shrink-wrap process is to stitch together 
Dubai, a city defined by disconnected development enclaves. 
 The recently opened Dubai Metro system can serve as a catalyst. The main line operates along Dubai’s central 
artery Sheikh Zayed Road, providing easy access between developments for the first time. The ground retrofit directive 
seeks to create easements for pedestrian access to metro stations and other urban amenities across and between 
developments. These easements provide access across otherwise forbidding obstacles such as private building 
podiums, walls, and multi-lane roads. The shrink-wrap ground strategy infills and maintains unused sites within existing 
developments while also anticipating future pedestrian easements. The retrofitting and shrink-wrapping of the ground, 
therefore, amends existing independent private developments with cohesive urban planning directives. The objective 
of these directives is to improve and infill existing developments rather than promote growth by expanding Dubai’s 
already over-extended built footprint. 
 Dubai’s newest building stock is predominantly designed for the high-end market, which denies multiple entry 
points for real estate investment. Furthermore, the collapse of the luxury property market creates greater pressure for 
the city to diversify its real estate offerings. The tower retrofit strategy engages redundant buildings near completion 
in relatively dense contexts and physically adjusts them to market conditions characterized by multi-class demand. 
The shrink-wrap tower directive decommissions built assets that are isolated, largely uninhabited and too costly to 
amend to suit market demands. The objective of this process is to reposition these buildings as investments for Dubai’s 
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future growth. Energy production and advertising are proposed as alternative means to generate income for property 
owners.
 The retrofit and shrink-wrap dialectic operates like a clearinghouse of Dubai’s redundant real estate, directing 
when and where to intervene in order to maximize recovery efforts. Each of the 866 at-risk development projects either 
commenced or completed in Dubai since 2006 has been indexed in terms of planning directive and time scale for 
intervention.  Buildings and sites slated for retrofit will immediately be evaluated for appropriate amendments to suit 
market demands and overall planning objectives. This process will unfold over the next 1-5 years. Buildings and sites 
slated for shrink-wrap will be immediately decommissioned and repositioned to generate alternative incomes for their 
owners. After a period of one year, buildings directed for short-term shrink-wrapping will be reconsidered for their 
retrofit potential. Mid to long term shrink-wrap directives will shutter properties for between 3-15 years before they 
will be evaluated for amendment and further investment. Given that Dubai’s property remains quite volatile, the retrofit 
and shrink-wrap directives must be reevaluated on a regular basis to suit long-term market trends and urban planning 
goals. 
 At the urban larger scale, the retrofit and shrink-wrap planning directives operate to amend and preserve the 
overall image and function of the city. High-priority planning directives engage sites and buildings characteristically 
close to a metro station inside well-established developments. The planning process for these areas should begin 
immediately. These sites will be predominantly retrofitted; however, the shrink-wrap directive will play a pivotal role in 
preparing under-developed parts of these sites for use in the long term. Medium-priority directives engage relatively 
new developments near major corridors such as Dubai Creek, Gulf Coast, Sheikh Zayed Road, and Emirates Road. Many 
of the projects within these developments are still under construction and will require an extended planning period 
of between 1-2 years before these sites and buildings will be retrofitted. The shrink-wrap strategy will operate to 
temporarily decommission these buildings and generate alternative income for developers while the retrofit planning 
process unfolds. Low priority directives predominantly engage the least developed areas of the city such as Dubailand, 
Dubai World Central and Palm Jebel Ali. These parts of the city will remain largely uninhabited for years to come, and the 
shrink-wrap directive will operate to decommission and preserve structures for up to 20 years while restoring natural 
desert ecologies where site and infrastructure work have commenced. The retrofitting over the long term of these low 
priority sites will be pursued once the most critical areas of the city have recovered.
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PROJECTED DUBAI METRO 
SYSTEM RIDERSHIP : PLANNED CAPACTIY OF 1 MILLION RIDERS PER DAY 60,000 RIDERS PER DAY IN 2009100,000+ RIDERS PER DAY PROJECTED IN 2010
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PACKAGE 4 // 10 CRITICAL SITES FOR IMMEDIATE RETROFIT AND SHRINK-WRAP
 
 Over the past 20 years, independent, privately held, master-plan developments have structured Dubai’s 
unprecedented growth. This market-driven development process, however, has operated in opposition to any 
comprehensive urban planning directives (guidelines). The resultant ad-hoc city has become vastly over-expanded, 
filled with redundant buildings and inefficient infrastructure. The retrofit and shrink-wrap directives function to correct 
these urban planning oversights, while also adjusting Dubai’s real estate offerings for investment in a vastly changed 
world market.  Of the 50+ master plans currently active, the following 10 represent the greatest economic value at 
risk: Business Bay, Culture Village, Dubai International Financial Center, Downtown Burj Dubai, Dubai Internet City, 
Dubai Marina, Dubai Sports City, Jumeirah Lake Towers, Jumeirah Village, and the Lagoons. The successful revision 
and preservation of these master-plan developments will play a critical role in Dubai’s long-term economic and urban 
recovery.
 Contextual and administrative criteria prioritize which of these 10 developments receive immediate intervention. 
Does the site figure prominently in the city, such that its decline would significantly damage Dubai’s image? Is the site’s 
population density sufficient to encourage a pedestrian-oriented environment? Is the site within walking distance (1 km) 
of a metro station? Is the site sufficiently completed to provide infrastructure and amenities to support an intervention? 
Is the master-plan developer solvent enough to invest further in the site? And lastly, is the master-plan developer 
sufficiently autonomous to immediately implement the retrofit and shrink- wrap planning directives?
 The new downtown area (Dubai International Financial Center, Downtown Burj Dubai, Business Bay) and the newest 
parts of suburban Jumeirah (Dubai Marina, Jumeirah Lake Towers, and Dubai Internet City) figure most prominently 
in Dubai’s real estate market. Each of these developments are located at major interchanges of Sheikh Zayed Road, 
whereas, less prominent sites are located along the southern reaches of the Dubai Creek and Emirates Road. The most 
prominent developments are also the most densely populated and closest to metro stations. The Dubai International 
Financial Center, Dubai Marina and Downtown Burj Dubai all boast population densities above 350 people per hectare 
comparable with London and parts of Manhattan. The Dubai International Financial Center, Dubai Internet City and Dubai 
Marina are the most pedestrian friendly, with the maximum distance to a metro station less than 1 kilometer. The final 
contextual consideration is the relative completion of the site. An optimal master-plan development for intervention is 
roughly half completed. These developments boast adequate urban infrastructure and amenities to support a revised 
project, but enough of the development remains incomplete to maximize the implementation of the retrofit and shrink-
wrap directives. Downtown Burj Dubai, Dubai International Financial Center and Jumeirah Lake Towers currently feature 
this level of completion. 
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 The administration of these master-plan developments greatly influences their potential for adjustment, 
according to market conditions and urban-planning directives. The solvency of the developer is critical to determine 
if the project has sufficient financial footing to attract further investment for necessary amendments. For example, 
projects by Nakheel would prove difficult to induce investment, for the master-plan developer nearly defaulted on 
billion-dollar bonds in late 2009. The most financially solvent developers such as EMAAR (Downtown Burj Dubai, and 
Dubai Marina) and the Dubai International Financial Center Authority will be prioritized for intervention. These master 
plan developers also boast the greatest financial and administrative autonomy, and could, therefore, immediately begin 
implementing the retrofit and shrink-wrap planning directives. Of the 10 critical sites, the Dubai International Financial 
Center consistently stands out as the highest-priority site for intervention; moreover, its firm financial footing will make 
it one of the first areas of the city to recover.
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PACKAGE 5 // DIFC ANALYSIS AND INTRODUCTION TO NEW PLANNING DIRECTIVES 
  
 With marginal oil reserves compared to its Gulf neighbors, Dubai has hedged its future on economic diversification, 
selling itself as the ultimate free market. In a region defined by conflict, an image of neutrality and stability serves 
Dubai well, making it a safe haven for investment in the Middle East. The financial services and real estate sectors 
have been pivotal contributors to the Emirate’s economic diversification; however, the global recession coupled with a 
local real estate meltdown puts these key economic sectors at risk of tarnishing Dubai’s safe-haven image. The Dubai 
International Financial Center (DIFC) straddles these two key markets serving as Dubai’s financial hub and a major 
luxury real estate development. Large sections of the DIFC, however, remain incomplete due to the the city’s recent 
economic downturn and population decline. The successful revision of the DIFC’s incomplete building and land assets 
to suit a vastly changed market, a revision targeted to meet multi-class demand and provide pedestrian access to mass 
transit, will be critical to Dubai’s long-term economic recovery and future growth. 
 Strategically positioned between European and East Asian markets, the DIFC and its Dubai Nasdaq exchange are 
the financial hubs of the United Arab Emirates and the Middle East as a whole. Its governing body, the DIFC Authority, 
operates independently from the Dubai and UAE state; therefore, it has great autonomy to make regulatory and planning 
decisions. This independence is both an asset and a hindrance to the successful revision of the DIFC’s building and land 
assets. The Authority can move quickly to amend its building regulations, but its autonomy makes it difficult to integrate 
and link with nearby developments. The DIFC is centrally located at Interchange 1 (Defense Roundabout) of Sheikh 
Zayed Road. It is part of the larger Downtown Dubai district, which features signature projects such as the world’s tallest 
building, the Burj Dubai, and the largest mall, Dubai Mall. The district formerly served as the headquarters of Dubai’s 
Ministry of Defense, which was transferred to federal command in Abu Dhabi in the late 1990’s. Dubai has refocused its 
financial resources away from defense to attracting foreign investment and trade. This district thus stands as a symbol 
of Dubai’s past political autonomy, as well as its future economic growth, under a federal system. 
 In 2003, planning consultants Gensler, Inc. drafted a master plan to redevelop 110 acres of the former military 
site into the DIFC. The architects envisioned a self-contained city-within-a-city “that has been planned and designed 
to become the ultimate in convenience for anyone seeking to live, work and enjoy their leisure time in one strategic 
location.” The plan mirrors the linear development of nearby Sheikh Zayed Road, with two continuous podiums running 
in parallel and linked by an enclosed retail spine.  The 2-5 level continuous podiums hold parking, private-access 
corridors and other amenities for the towers above. Though these planning regulations create a well-connected 
pedestrian environment within the confines of the site, they deny efficient public access to nearby developments and 
metro stations along Sheikh Zayed Road. These podiums essentially wall-in the DIFC from its surroundings, creating 
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a stark visual and physical disengagement with the nearby Sheikh Zayed Road Towers and other developments. The 
Gate Building anchors the DIFC by framing views of the central spine of the site. Buildings, which immediately surround 
th Gate Building, house the stock exchange, financial firms and administrative offices. Beyond the Gate Precinct, the 
DIFC is composed of high-end commercial and residential buildings above inter-connected podiums. These property 
offerings proved lucrative at the height of Dubai’s speculative real estate frenzy, but the recent real estate collapse of 
the luxury property market has made them redundant. The site was projected to accomodate 40,000 full-time residents 
and a daytime population of over 100,000. Currently, only 2-3 thousand people live in the district, while up to 30,000 
work there each day. This under-population leaves large sections of the DIFC uninhabited and unused. The master plan 
calls for two phases of development. The first phase is controlled by the DIFC Authority and designed by Gensler, Inc. 
Individual developers are responsible for the design and construction of the second phase, which covers roughly 2/5 
of the site closest to Doha Road and the adjacent Downtown Burj Dubai development. The master plan provides for the 
DIFC to be substantially completed by 2010, a goal that is far from being reached.
 Major elements of this first phase are completed; however, many buildings remain under construction, while 
some large sites remain undeveloped. Only one of the second phase bulidings is complete, and the remaining plots 
are under construction or undeveloped. The DIFC is fragmented, with major gaps in the planned continuous podium 
structure. The incomplete status of the master plan creates opportunity to critique and correct the inefficiencies inherent 
in a linear self-contained development strategy. A dialectical process of retrofitting and shrink-wrapping incomplete 
buildings and undeveloped sites in the DIFC and adjacent Sheikh Zayed Road Towers serves as an alternative planning 
strategy. These directives thus engage the ground, podiums and towers of the site to introduce a multi-class pedestrian 
environment well connected to developments both nearby and beyond, via the Dubai Metro. 
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PLANNING DIRECTIVE 1 // RETROFIT GROUND
  
 Since 1990, Dubai has grown along the Sheikh Zayed Road corridor. This linear development has created extreme 
traffic congestion and other urban inefficiencies as the city has expanded rapidly, while its transportation infrastructure 
has not. The recently completed Dubai Metro system runs in parallel with the highway and was intended relieve 
congestion by providing a mass-transit alternative to private vehicular transportation. Many of the stations, however, are 
not easily accessible, due to road obstructions and harsh desert climate conditions. Bus lines have been added in areas 
that could easily be accessible on foot had they been planned with adequate density and infrastructure to anticipate the 
metro. This lack of coordination between developers, transportation planners and city planners necessitates a sweeping 
planning directive to provide access to the Metro, without the need of short-range buses.
 The Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) enjoys close proximity to two metro stations, Emirate Towers 
Station and Financial Center Station. Both stations are within walking distance (less than 1 kilometer) from any DIFC 
building; however,  the planned continuous building podiums would obstruct access to the metro stations. Large tracts 
of the DIFC remain incomplete or undeveloped and should be revised to accommodate pedestrian right-of-ways for 
access across the site and beyond. The ground retrofit directive; therefore, establishes permanent easements which run 
perpendicular to the linearly oriented DIFC. Two right-of-ways directly link to the metro stations. The first connects the 
Gate Complex to the Emirates Towers Station, and the second runs down the mid-section of the DIFC linking buildings 
to the Financial Center Station. 4 additional easements link the rest of the site at an interval of .25 kilometers to ensure 
consistent pedestrian access. Each easement is limited to 1km (walking distance) in length from a metro station. 
Shading and ventilation is critical especially during the summer months to make these corridors usable throughout the 
year. Analysis of sun shading and prevailing winds at the DIFC have determined where a canopy system will be necessary 
and how to calibrate it to benefit from natural shading and ventilation. In areas with consistently little wind, a natural-
canopy system of palm trees is proposed to provide shaded spaces for pedestrians to congregate.  The canopy system 
thus creates semi-conditioned spaces for pedestrians, while also marking permanently easements through buildings 
podiums yet to be built. Therefore, as the DIFC develops further, the canopy may be removed; however, the pedestrian 
easement will be integrated into the newly built podium. This retrofit ground directive requires the cooperation of 
the DIFC Authority, Dubai  Rapid Transit Authority, and individual property owners to introduce right-of-ways through 
largely undeveloped sites. 
 The design intervention (Metro Canopy) for this directive develops schematic plans for a canopy system and 
easements connecting directly to the Emirates Towers Metro Station. 
_see pages 
110-111
_see pages 
112-115
PACKAGE 3 
_see pages 
44-45
Package 7
 _see pages 
142-49
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
PLANNING DIRECTIVE 2A // SHRINK-WRAP GROUND_SHEIKH ZAYED ROAD PLOTS
  
 Sheikh Zayed Road is famous for its long row of super-tall towers that flank each side of the super-highway. The 
buildings occupy tiny plots with detached parking garages located behind; therefore, Dubai’s Manhattanesque skyline 
is only one tower and a parking garage deep. This territorial structure either ignores or under-values visual and physical 
connections with developments behind the row of detached parking garages. Residents and workers in these towers 
will benefit most from Dubai’s recently opened metro system, which runs in parallel with the highway. Access to the 
metro beyond this thin line of towers; however, will be critical to the success of mass transit to alleviate congestion 
along Sheikh Zayed Road, while also making car-centric Dubai more pedestrian friendly. Undeveloped sites along this 
corridor present opportunity to revise them to ensure permanent access to the metro while also creating a strong visual 
and physical connection with adjacent developments, including the DIFC. 
 A number of plots along Sheikh Zayed Road, adjacent to the DIFC, remain undeveloped. They consist of two 
types, sites completely undeveloped and sites only with a tower. The entirely undeveloped tower + garage sites should 
be combined into one plot to augment perpendicular movement from Sheikh Zayed Road to the DIFC. The plots already 
with a tower but without a parking garage should be subdivided such that the former garage plot becomes a mid-rise 
tower plot. Each zoning change would not only ensure pedestrian access by removing parking from these sites, but they 
would reorient the tower plots to engage the DIFC. 
 Development of these sites will not take place for between 1-3 years given the current real estate over-supply 
in Dubai; therefore, a directive to shrink-wrap the ground on these sites will serve as a temporary register changes to 
the tower plot configuration and preserve the site to be more desirable for investment. A pre-dug foundation will be 
filled with plug-in environments such as a micro beach, green house, sculpture park, or temporary shops. Each plug-
in environment has the potential to create interactive environments for pedestrians and generate income for property 
owners. Once these sites are developed, these pedestrian amenities on the ground must be maintained in the finished 
building. The ground shrink-wrap directive for Sheikh Zayed Road will require the cooperation of individual developers 
to make minimal investments to preserve and activate their undeveloped properties. 
 The design intervention (Void Scape) for this directive develops schematic plans for a micro-beach on an entirely 
undeveloped tower + parking garage plot. This site also flanks a major pedestrian easement proposed in Retrofit 
Ground Directive.
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PLANNING DIRECTIVE 2B // SHRINK-WRAP GROUND_DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTER PLOTS
  
 The master plan of the Dubai International Financial Center stipulates an alternative territorial structure to the 
hyper-dense Sheikh Zayed Road Towers. Plots in the DIFC are significantly larger those along Shiekh Zayed Road and 
must include a 2-5 floor podium, linked to adjacent plots.  The planning objective is to create a continuous podiums that 
run the length of the DIFC. Development of sites within the DIFC thus require heavy infrastructural investment and an 
extended planning process to meet the strict master-plan regulations. Given the DIFC already has many buildings under-
construction that will become redundant in current market conditions, entirely undeveloped sites will remain vacant for 
5 or more years. Thus, these sites must be set aside to focus instead on the revision of already built assets. The shrink-
wrap directive acts to first embed permanent pedestrian easements through these plots, then preserves them for later 
development. To visually and physically register this change, a wall is to be constructed around each site. The resultant 
hold-out strategy makes the sites more desirable by removing them from the real estate market until sufficient investor 
interest leads to their development. This ground shrink-wrap directive requires the cooperation of the DIFC Authority to 
remove these redundant sites from the market and preserve them for eventual use in the long term.
 The intervention (Land Preserve) for this directive decommissions one large DIFC plot for up to 10 years, 
effectively removing it for consideration for development until the other major retrofit and shrink-wrap directives have 
been implemented. 
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PLANNING DIRECTIVE 3 // RETROFIT TOWER
  
 Dubai’s recent building boom has focused almost entirely on the high-end property market. The recent economic 
downturn has made some of these units affordable to upper-middle class residents and ex-pats in Dubai; however, 
these high-end properties deny a multi-class live-work environment in the newest parts of the city. Demand for multi-
class units has escalated rapidly as upper-class demand has waned. Thus, as Dubai’s real estate market diversifies to 
accommodate multi-entry points for investment, towers currently under construction and planned for the high-end 
market have become obsolete, even before completion. To reposition these assets to current and projected market 
conditions, they must be revised.
 Multi-class settlement in Dubai is predominantly in the oldest areas of the city, such as Diera, Bur Dubai and 
Satwa, consist of entirely lease-only properties for the majority ex-patriot population. Residency visas in Dubai require 
either employment or property ownership. Should an ex-pat not own property and lose their job, they are immediately 
deported. Universal access to property ownership, therefore, is critical to the stability of a multi-class real estate market 
in Dubai. The newest areas of the city permit freehold property ownership to foreign citizens but prices in these areas 
are largely out of reach. Thus, the successful retrofit of units in these freehold developments to suit multi-class demand 
will be pivotal to facilitate recovery of the real estate market. This process would also populate areas of the city that 
would otherwise be left largely uninhabited, as vacation or investment properties. 
 Before 2009, the construction, management and title of the building were held by the real estate developer. 
This monolithic control denies agency to individual unit owners in the building; moreover, it prevents diversification 
and subdivision of units without developer consent. The No. 27 Strata Title Law, however, enables the subdivision of 
a building both horizontally and vertically. As such, under a strata title system, a building that has multiple ownership 
may be subdivided into defined units and common areas, with a title issued to the owner of each unit. The retrofit tower 
directive thus capitalizes on the Strata title law to introduce multi-class ownership within towers previously designed 
only for the high-end market. 
 The Dubai International Financial Center has 10+ currently under-construction or stopped tower projects of 
sufficient density and proximity to the metro, to be retrofitted for multi-class ownership. Living arrangements with varying 
degrees of collectiveness are proposed to test the tastes of the multi-class market. These sub-division strategies are 
facilitated by an adjustable partition system, which delivers essential services to each flat such as electricity, ventilation, 
gas, and telecom. Cooperation between the DIFC, developer and individual tenents is necessary to achieve the goal of 
diversifying the unit types available as these buildings are completed.
 The intervention (Social Strata) for this directive retrofits one tower and podium, to suit multi-class living. 
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PLANNING DIRECTIVE 4 // SHRINK-WRAP TOWER
  
 High-rise building developers in Dubai compete to produce the most iconic, ostentatious landmark possible. 
These follies innefficiently use material and energy resources; moreover, they do little to promote pedestrian life on 
the ground. Hundreds of these buildings remain stopped mid-construction in Dubai, leaving developers with no income 
from these investments. The built asset is further devalued as it stands unprotected from harsh desert conditions. 
The shrink-wrap directive proposes a temporary façade for these buildings that protects the structure and provides 
alternative developer income, such as proceeds from harvesting solar energy and advertising. Part of the income could 
be used to facilitate pedestrian life below with palm trees and other shading devices. At night, the energy stored during 
the day could be used to produce an LED spectacle for advertisement and information display. The objective of this 
process is reposition an incomplete façade as follie into a performative landmark, while the building itself remains 
decommissioned. When the real estate market recovers and the tower is completed, these performative functions would 
be integrated into the permanent structure. 
 Multiple buildings in the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) are currently under-construction in mostly 
undeveloped parts of the site. These isolated buildings are poor candidates for retrofit in the near term but will be 
important assets, once the real estate market recovers. The shrink-wrap directive thus decommissions these buildings and 
preserves them, until real-estate market conditions improve. The temporary façade is composed of a lightweight Teflon 
coated fabric pleated for structural stability. Thin film photovoltaics are woven into the façade to collect solar energy, 
while advertisements printed onto the surface provide another source of revenue of the developer. The cooperation of 
individual developers to remove their buildings from the market will be necessary to reposition these redundant assets 
for future use.  
 The intervention (Pleats Please) for this directive develops schematic plans to shrink-wraps a set of twin 
towers.
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PLANNING DIALECTIC // RETROFIT + SHRINK-WRAP THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTER
  
 Originally to be completed in 2011, the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) remains largely unrealized. 
Continuous building podiums were envisioned to create a self-contained “city within a city.” Vacant building plots 
throughout the midsection of the development, however, impede the desired live-work environment from reaching frui-
tion. There are no plans to develop these sites. The resultant fragmentation of the development keeps many buildings 
isolated from amenities essential for the DIFC to reach its planning goals of being self-contained and self-sufficient. For 
example, residents and workers in these isolated towers have to drive 2-5 kilometers to nearby developments to use a 
grocery store or dry cleaning services. Littered with construction debris, vacant building sites also impede pedestrian 
access throughout the DIFC, increasing reliance on car transport in a development planned to be walkable. Two metro 
stations have been opened close to the DIFC, but lack of coordination with nearby developments prevents easy access 
to mass transit stations, with impediments such as major roads, walls and buildings. For the DIFC to become a viable 
place to live and work, significant long-term changes to the master plan must be pursued to improve access within 
and beyond the DIFC. The retrofit and shrink-wrap ground directives introduce permanent pedestrian easements that 
ensure access from the DIFC to nearby buildings and Dubai Metro Stations. The planning directives also decommission 
and preserve derelict, undeveloped building plots, making them more attractive for future investment and introducing 
temporary outdoor amenities for residents and workers. 
 All buildings currently under construction at the DIFC are targeted for the high-end real estate market; however, 
the prolonged decline of luxury property sales, beginning in 2008, has dried up demand for units in these buildings. An 
undersupply of multi-class residential units has created demand for developments with more diverse property offerings. 
The retrofit and shrink-wrap tower directives physically revise the DIFC’s building stock to suit market demands. This 
process would unfold over the next 10 years, retrofitting building in more complete areas first. Isolated projects would 
be shrink-wrapped until sufficient demand necessitates that they be retrofitted.
 The retrofit and shrink-wrap planning directives thus operate dialectally to provide an alternative DIFC master 
plan. These directives integrate the DIFC with the larger city and adjust its property offerings to a vastly changed real 
estate market.
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PACKAGE 7 // DIFC DESIGN INTERVENTIONS 
  
 The following design interventions translate the retrofit and shrink wrap planning directives into built form, 
speculating on how these designs will look and be experienced in situ.
Ground Retrofit Directive // Metro Canopy
 The Metro-Canopy system creates a semi-enclosed environment for convenient pedestrian access from the DIFC 
to the Emirates Towers and Financial Center metro stations. These canopies are to be installed over permanent public 
easements, introduced in PACKAGE 6. Funding and operation of the canopy system will require the cooperation of the 
Dubai Rapid Transportation Authority and the DIFC Authority. Investment in the canopy system not only would greatly 
improve access to the metro, but it would minimize the need for air-conditioned short-range buses to service each 
metro station. 
 The canopy provides essential shading and ventilation through a lightweight structure and skin system. A tensile 
fabric surface is fastened to columns (wind catchers) rising 3-5 meters above the ground. The fabric is Teflon-coated 
and weather resistant. The geometry of the canopies is both structurally stable and directs wind currents to ventilate 
the space below. All parts of the canopy are fully adjustable to orient with prevailing wind patterns at any point in the 
DIFC. The design addresses four typical conditions: linking with a metro station, building abutment, road crossing and 
terminus.  A voluptuously vaulted space below fosters a public commons, viable even during the hot summer months.
 The planning and implementation of this intervention must be immediate to ensure adequate access to each 
metro station and to prevent unnecessary investment by the RTA for costly short-range buses. 
Ground Shrink-Wrap Directives // Void Scape and Land Preserve
 The Void Scape is an intervention intended for small plots along Sheikh Zayed Road. A foundation anticipating 
a future project is dug then filled with temporary (1-3 year) outdoor attractions to put the otherwise vacant site to use. 
The proposed design envisions a micro-beach environment for residents and visitors to the area. This activation of the 
site not only preserves the site from becoming derelict, but also provides potential alternative income for the property 
owner, with admissions and other charges to visitors.The Land Preserve effectively removes a large undeveloped site 
from the market in the DIFC, and preserves it for use after 3-10 years. The site is walled off, and a geo-textile ground 
cover stabilizes the sandy landscape within. Denying the site to the market for an extended time, a holdout strategy, 
makes the property more attractive for investment, once it is re-commissioned. The wall is made from concrete block, 
originally intended to line the walls of a cancelled portion of the Dubai Creek Extension project. 
(fold out map)
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Tower Retrofit Directive // Social Strata
 Social Strata is a design intervention intended to introduce multi-class living in the Currency House Tower, a 
project originally designed for the luxury market. The building is mostly completed; however, portions of its façade 
and its interior remain unfinished. Four living environments are proposed, each with varying degrees of collective 
interaction. Courtyard living is first introduced in the building podium, and requires the carving of 2 level voids for 
light and air to reach all apartments. Each apartment (50-150 m^2) will share an outdoor commons with 2-5 other 
units. Lounge Living creates an enclosed version of the courtyard within the tower. Each resident would have their own 
apartment (35-100 m^2) replete with bedroom, bath, kitchen, while they would share a larger living room space with 
2-3 other units. Collective living is intended for residents interested in living with an extended family or friends, and 
offers shared living and kitchen facilities for between 4-12 apartments (25-75m^2). The final living arrangement made 
available is most similar to pre-existing units in the building, serviced apartments (35-150 m^2). Each of the 4 living 
arrangements is designed on same the 7 meter x 7 meter structural grid, such that they can be inter-changed to suit 
long-term market demand. A performative façade with photovoltaic operable curtains is proposed to provide energy 
for common spaces throughout the building. This project will require the cooperation of the property developer and 
building owners to fund and maintain the retrofitted tower. 
Shrink-Wrap Tower Directive // Pleats Please
 Pleats Please proposes a design intervention to provide a temporary façade for a pair of incomplete twin 
skyscrapers, Park Towers. Each irregularly shaped tower would require significant material to be wasted in tailoring the 
Teflon-coated fabric to fit its geometry; therefore, an alternative process of pleating (folding) the fabric to fit the tower 
is proposed. The material then can be removed once the tower is ready to be retrofitted and then used elsewhere in the 
city. Funding for the project comes from advertising applied to the temporary façade. Thin film photovoltaic panels can 
also be integrated to harvest energy during the day for lighting and advertising at night. These shrink-wrapped towers 
create a new performative landmark for the DIFC, clearly visible from the Financial Center Metro Station.
Combined Directives // Grid Pro Quo
 Together, these interventions actively improve the urban experience of the DIFC, while also making the 
development more competitive in a real estate market with more diverse tastes. These interventions provide short and 
long-term design solutions that are econically viable to attract investment, while also improving quality of life in the 
DIFC and its surroundings.
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PACKAGE 8 // INTERVENTION BEYOND THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTER 
  
  Since 2008, the collapse of Dubai’s high-end property market has halted the unprecedented expansion of the 
city’s built footprint. Mega-developments such as Dubailand, Palm Diera and Dubai World Central have been put on 
indefinite hold, as hundreds of building projects have been stopped mid-construction. Scores of recently completed 
buildings have few or no occupants, further confirming that Dubai’s real estate market, which consists primarily of 
luxury properties, is vastly over-supplied. Pent-up demand exists for multi-class residential and office space in Dubai; 
however, current building configurations are inadequate to accommodate this market potential. The prolonged pause in 
Dubai’s malignant growth provides an opportunity to assess and adjust the city’s existing building stock to suit a more 
diverse real estate market. Real estate investment in Dubai will now require a long-term commitment by government 
and private interests to correct the city’s ill-positioned property market.
 This coordinated recovery cannot be achieved without comprehensive urban-planning guidelines, including 
adequate transportation infrastructure and urban amenities to support each building. If a building is adjusted to suit 
diverse market tastes, but it still lacks access to mass transportation or grocery stores, then it will remain unoccupied. 
The recently completed Dubai Metro system provides mass-transit service close enough to many of the buildings 
slated for adjustment, but these developments lack appropriate pedestrian rights-of-way to make the rail stations 
accessible. Public commons, markets, and other amenities must also be provided to enliven the areas around and within 
each building, making them more attractive for investment. Coordinated government investment and private-property 
concessions will be necessary to provide these essential infrastructure and amenity upgrades.
 The retrofit and shrink-wrap planning dialectic operates over the next 10-15 years as a clearinghouse for 
Dubai’s injured property market, improving individual buildings and simultaneously introducing comprehensive 
planning initiatives for transportation access and public amenities on the ground. The design interventions tested on 
the Dubai International Financial Center provide a range of possibilities to induce economic and urban recovery within 
the development and its immediate context. These proposals could easily be adjusted to be deployed throughout the 
city. Each development would be assessed according to its immediate surroundings and overall importance to Dubai’s 
image and function, and retrofit and shrink-wrap strategies tailored to be most effective within the given context. For 
example, the Dubai Marina will be predominantly retrofitted because the overall development is nearly complete and 
occupied. It is similarly compact and close to metro stations as the DIFC, and investment to alter under-performing 
buildings will be minimal in comparison to more isolated and incomplete developments, such as Jumeirah Village. 
This remote master-plan development, located along Emirates Road, boasts only a handful of completed buildings, 
while a majority of the land area remains undeveloped or occupied by stopped-building projects. The site is 10km 
177
from the nearest metro station. Given these contextual conditions, Jumeirah Village would be primarily shrink-wrapped 
until the retrofit process is completed in more strategically important areas of the city. Specific interventions for each 
development and its surroundings will require extensive research and planning to develop the most economically viable 
and urbanistically just solution. Thus, the retrofit and shrink-wrap planning dialectic is proposed as both a long-term 
strategy for investment in Dubai real estate and an alternative city-wide master plan. 
 
 If you are interested in hearing more about this long-term planning and design initiative in Dubai, please contact 
us at the Dubai Urban Recovery Initiative:
Charles Curran (M.Arch)
Chief Strategist, Dubai Urban Recovery Initiative
MIT School of Architecture
77 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 10-390
Cambridge, MA 02139
ccurran@mit.edu
Nasser Rabbat (PhD)
Supervisor, Dubai Urban Recovery Initiative
Director, Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture
Professor of Architecture History
MIT School of Architecture
77 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 10-390
Cambridge, MA 02139
nasser@mit.edu
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